A report from the Office of the University Economist by Hoffman, Dennis (Author) et al.
TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATION PROPOSALS 
IN ARIZONA 
 
 
 
A Report from the Office of the University Economist 
 
 
 
Updated, 3 March 2011 
 
 
 
Dennis Hoffman, Ph.D. 
Professor, Department of Economics; Director, L. William Seidman Research Institute; 
and Director, Office of the University Economist 
 
Timothy Hogan, Ph.D. 
Professor Emeritus, Department of Economic;,  
and Senior Research Associate, L. William Seidman Research Institute 
 
Tom Rex, M.B.A. 
Associate Director, Center for Competitiveness and Prosperity Research; 
and Manager of Research Initiatives, Office of the University Economist 
 
 
Center for Competitiveness and Prosperity Research 
L. William Seidman Research Institute 
W. P. Carey School of Business 
Arizona State University 
Box 874011 
Tempe, Arizona 85287-4011 
 
(480) 965-5362 
FAX: (480) 965-5458 
EMAIL: Dennis.Hoffman@asu.edu or Tom.Rex@asu.edu 
wpcarey.asu.edu/research/competitiveness-prosperity-research 
economist.asu.edu 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Summary 1 
Introduction 4 
Tax and Expenditure Limitations 4 
Colorado’s TABOR 5 
   Provisions 5 
   Comparison of TABOR to Other TELs 7 
   Fiscal Impacts 8 
   Referendum C 9 
   TABOR and Economic Growth 10 
A TABOR-Like Limitation in Arizona 11 
   Proposals 13 
   Problems Created by A TABOR-Like Approach 16 
   Revenue Implications of A TABOR-Like Rule 17 
Fiscal Alternatives for Arizona 22 
   Governor’s Proposal 22 
   Evaluation of Governor’s Proposal 23 
   Recommendations 24 
References 28 
 
 
LIST OF CHARTS 
 
1. State Government Own-Source Revenues 12 
2. Appropriations in Arizona Under a Tabor-Like Rule Compared to Actual Appropriations, 
Beginning in Fiscal Year 1981 
19 
3. Own-Source Revenues in Arizona Under a Tabor-Like Rule Compared to Actual Revenues, 
Beginning in Fiscal Year 1981 
20 
4. Own-Source Revenues in Arizona Under a Tabor-Like Rule Compared to Actual Revenues, 
Beginning in Fiscal Year 1960 
21 
5. Appropriations and Appropriations Limit as a Percentage of Personal Income, Arizona State 
Government 
26 
6. Revenues and Expenditures Per $1,000 of Personal Income, Arizona State Government 
General Fund 
27 
 
 
i 
 
SUMMARY 
Tax and expenditure limits (TELs) are laws or constitutional provisions that restrict the level or 
growth of government revenues or expenditures. Most limits are defined in terms of a maximum 
level or rate of increase that is tied to one or more economic measures, such as personal income, 
population, or inflation. A TEL was in place in 30 states in 2009. Most were adopted during the 
tax-revolt period of the late 1970s or during the 1990s. Arizona has a TEL, adopted in the late 
1970s, that limits state government appropriations to a percentage of the state’s personal income. 
 
TABOR Provisions 
Colorado’s tax and expenditure limitation—the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, popularly known by 
its TABOR acronym—was voter approved in 1992. It has been widely adopted by the anti-tax 
movement as the model that other states (and the federal government) should emulate. National 
and local groups have pushed TABOR-like proposals in numerous states, including Arizona; 
TELs similar to TABOR have been enacted in Ohio and Washington. 
 
While TABOR has many provisions, two are of key significance: 
• Government spending growth is restricted to the sum of inflation and population growth. 
• The sum of inflation and population growth is applied to the prior year’s actual 
expenditures—if expenditures are below the spending limit, then the spending limit 
permanently falls. 
 
The first provision limits government growth to a more narrow measure than is in place in 
Arizona and most of the other states with a TEL. By using personal income as the basis for its 
limit, Arizona’s existing TEL effectively incorporates inflation, population growth, and real per 
capita economic growth. The latter represents productivity growth, which has averaged between 
1.5 and 2 percent per year. If government is allowed to grow at the pace of overall economic 
growth, its size as a percentage of the entire economy is constant, as is the tax burden. If 
government growth is limited to population growth and inflation, government’s share of the 
economy will decrease over time and the quality and quantity of government services will be 
frozen at existing levels. The public sector will have no ability to respond to technological or 
societal changes that require additional spending, at least not without reducing funding for 
existing programs. 
 
The second TABOR provision creates a “ratchet-down effect.” Government revenues are highly 
cyclical, falling on an inflation-adjusted per person basis during economic recessions. By tying 
the inflation and population growth formula to actual spending when it is lower than the limit, 
spending cuts made during a recession in order to balance the budget become permanent. Under 
this provision, government’s share of the economy—and the quality and quantity of public 
services—falls precipitously over time. Coloradoans recognized this significant problem and 
voted for a referendum in 2005 that effectively eliminates TABOR’s ratchet-down effect. 
 
In addition to these broad concerns, an inflation and population growth rule has other 
shortcomings. The subpopulations served by government programs grow at different rates than 
the growth rate of total state population used in the formula. For example, over the 1993-to-2010 
period (beginning with the base year for Colorado’s TABOR), the state prison population in 
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Arizona expanded by 138 percent and the number of AHCCCS (Arizona’s Medicaid program) 
beneficiaries increased 192 percent while the state’s population grew by 81 percent. 
 
Similarly, changes in the cost of providing public services are not adequately measured by the 
overall inflation rate. While the overall rate of inflation over the 1993-to-2010 period totaled 41 
percent, medical care prices rose 93 percent and the cost of inputs for higher education 
institutions increased 78 percent. 
 
While proponents point to TABOR as enhancing Colorado’s economic growth during the 1990s, 
several studies found no relationship between TABOR and economic performance. In the last 
economic cycle (2001 through 2009), Colorado’s economic performance slumped from above to 
below the U.S. average, with Colorado ranking near the bottom of the western states. 
 
Arizona Proposals 
Five bills and resolutions that would limit revenues or appropriations have been introduced in 
Arizona’s 2011 regular legislative session. As of March 3, 2011, all were proceeding through the 
Legislature. One resolution would reduce the existing appropriation limit while the other 
measures would mimic TABOR. The two Senate bills each would mandate the publication of a 
TABOR-like spending limit and would force the Legislature to publicize any intent to exceed the 
limit, but would not actually restrict appropriations. In contrast, one resolution would 
constitutionally create an enforceable TABOR-like rule in Arizona that is applied to a measure of 
total appropriations from all state government funds. The House bill would limit general fund 
revenues. The latter resolution and the three bills incorporate both of the primary provisions of 
Colorado’s TABOR. 
 
Had Arizona’s TEL that became effective in fiscal year 1981 included an inflation plus 
population growth limit, the impact on state government 30 years later would have been 
substantial. Even without a ratchet-down effect, the fiscal year 2011 budget would have been 22 
percent less than the actual budget—which already reflects very substantial spending reductions 
made over the last three years. The budget would have been 59 percent less with the ratchet-
down effect. Total appropriations (not just those in the general fund) in fiscal year 2011 would 
have been $2.8 billion less than the actual $12.8 billion without a ratchet effect and $7.5 billion 
less with a ratchet effect. 
 
These substantial effects would continue to grow in magnitude over a longer time span. Had an 
inflation plus population growth limit been in effect for the 50 years from 1959 through 2009, 
per capita state government revenues in fiscal year 2009 would have been 87 percent less than 
the national average. Revenues per $1,000 of personal income would have been 84 percent 
below average and 79 percent below those of the next-lowest state. Total revenues would have 
been only $2.8 billion, slightly more than one-sixth of the actual figure. For comparison, actual 
state government expenditures for elementary and secondary education alone was $4.2 billion—
and Arizona already ranks near the bottom of the states on per pupil K-12 expenditures. 
 
Even before the recent budget cuts, government spending in Arizona was well below the national 
average and was falling over time relative to other states. Similarly, the state’s tax burden was 
dropping and ranked 41st in the nation in 2008. Effectively, the adoption of any of the proposals 
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would at a minimum permanently lock in place the state’s existing low level of public services. 
Four of the five pending bills and resolutions—those with TABOR-like provisions—would go 
much further, causing the quality and quantity of public services to fall much further over time. 
With funding reductions to services that businesses need, especially education and public 
infrastructure, the state’s economic competitiveness would decline, as would the quality of life of 
the state’s residents. 
 
In addition to these legislative proposals, The Executive Budget issued by the office of Governor 
Brewer in January 2011 proposed budget reform that includes a spending limit. While the 
analysis in this report suggests that several issues in the Governor’s proposed spending limit 
should be addressed, the Governor’s proposal would be far less damaging to public services and 
to the Arizona economy than the three TABOR-like measures introduced in the Legislature. 
 
Recommendations 
As an alternative to the provisions of the Governor’s proposal regarding a spending limit or any 
of the legislative TEL proposals, the existing constitutional spending limit is adequate to protect 
against increases in the size of state government. However, since spending has been so far below 
the limit for many years, the existing limit does not preclude permanent increases to spending 
from being made without an equivalent increase in revenues. 
 
The most effective solution is for the Constitution to prohibit any permanent increase in spending 
from being made without an accompanying permanent increase in revenues of an equal 
magnitude (or equivalent decreases in other spending categories). Likewise, no permanent 
reduction to tax rates or bases would be allowed without corresponding reductions in spending of 
an equal magnitude (or equivalent increases in other revenues). 
 
One exception would need to be made to these prohibitions. Spending would be allowed to rise 
without a permanent revenue increase (or offsetting spending reductions in other categories) 
following a recession during which spending reductions were made in order to meet the 
constitutional requirement to balance the budget. If significant changes were made to the state 
government’s revenue system and to its rainy-day fund, instances of needing to use this 
exception would be very infrequent. 
 
If an annual spending growth limit is deemed essential, the limit should be tied to the average 
change in inflation-adjusted per capita personal income over the latest economic cycle (or two 
cycles), adjusted for expected inflation and population growth over the next year. This would be 
more in line with the existing constitutional appropriation limit that is tied to personal income. 
Under this limit, government spending could increase no faster than the pace of the overall 
economy; state government would remain a constant share of the economy; and the tax burden 
would not rise. 
 
Because current spending is far below historical levels due to the sharp recessionary-caused 
declines in revenues in recent years and to the structural deficit, current spending is an 
unrepresentative point for starting a new expenditure limit. Instead, the spending limit should be 
tied to fiscal year 2008 adjusted for subsequent inflation, population growth, and real per capita 
personal income growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Five bills and resolutions to limit the size of state government were introduced in the Arizona 
Legislature early in 2011. Two are concurrent resolutions that require the assent of both 
legislative houses and an affirmative public vote to be added to the Arizona Constitution. The 
other three are bills that if approved by both houses and not vetoed by the Governor become 
statutory law 90 days after the end of the legislative session. In addition, the Governor has 
proposed several budget reform measures, including a spending limit. 
 
Four of the five legislative measures introduced have clauses that are similar to the core 
provisions of the Colorado Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR). Since a multiyear track record 
of the impacts of Colorado’s constitutional amendment on government and on the economy is 
available, the situation in Colorado is examined in this paper before addressing what might occur 
in Arizona if any of these bills and resolutions become law. 
 
Colorado’s TABOR is a specific type of tax and expenditure limitation (TEL). Arizona also has 
an existing TEL that was passed in 1978 and became effective in fiscal year 1980. Arizona’s 
TEL limits appropriations to a percentage of personal income. 
 
TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 
Various types of tax and expenditure limitations have been adopted in the majority of states. 
Proponents of TELs assert that without such restraints the normal political process will result in 
increasing tax burdens and a growing government sector over time. This had indeed been the 
case for the first 30 years after World War II, but the special factors that caused this increased 
size of state and local governments cannot be generalized to be a predisposition of state and local 
governments always to increase taxes. 
 
Instead, the increase in the relative size of state and local governments after the war occurred for 
three primary reasons: (1) state and local government spending had fallen substantially during 
the war and thus was simply returning to prior levels; (2) the large size of the baby-boom 
generation caused demand for state and local government programs—especially education, the 
main use of state and local government revenues—to rise from the 1950s into the 1970s; and (3) 
the federal expansion of health and welfare programs that began during the 1960s mandated state 
and local governments to increase spending on these programs. 
 
California’s Proposition 13, which focused on property tax relief and was approved by voters in 
June 1978, is often credited as the first of the tax and expenditure limitation initiatives. After 
that, most limitations passed by states have applied to overall revenues or spending. California 
passed a more comprehensive TEL in 1979. 
 
Most TELs have established some form of “fiscal cap” on revenues and/or spending. These fiscal 
caps have been based on two basic approaches: (1) a limit on total revenues or total spending as a 
proportion of some measure of the size of the total economy; or (2) a limit on the future rate of 
growth of revenue and/or spending. 
 
In addition to these fiscal cap TELs, about one-third of the states have established the 
requirement of a supermajority vote (usually two-thirds) of the legislature for any tax increase. 
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The supermajority requirements are not TELs in the conventional sense since they do not directly 
limit revenue or spending growth. Three states go further, requiring voter approval of tax 
increases. 
 
Although TELs could be adopted that would cause immediate cuts in spending or taxes, both the 
supermajority requirement and the fiscal caps that have been put into effect have been aimed at 
restricting the growth of the public sector or limiting its size to some proportion of the total 
economy. 
 
TABOR is a fiscal-cap TEL. As of 2009, some form of fiscal-cap TEL had been adopted in 30 
states. Some states, like Colorado, actually have more than one type of fiscal cap in force. The 
precise formulation of these fiscal-cap TELs differs widely. The key differences relate to 
whether the limit is on spending or revenue, how the limit is calculated, and the treatment of any 
surplus over the limit: 
• Budget measure to which the limit applies 
o spending 
o revenues 
o estimated revenues 
o combination of spending/revenues/appropriations 
• Calculation of the limit 
o sum of population growth and inflation 
o share of personal income 
o percent change of personal income 
o percent of revenue received 
o a variety of miscellaneous other systems 
• Treatment of the Surplus 
o refund of surplus required 
o partial return of surplus 
o deposited into “rainy day” fund 
o used to retire debt 
o combination approaches 
o not specified 
For a more complete comparative analysis of TELs, see Resnick 2004, Hill et. al. 2006, and 
Waisanen 2009. 
 
COLORADO’S TABOR 
The Colorado Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights is an amendment to the Colorado Constitution (Article 
X, Section 20) that was approved by voter initiative in 1992 and was first applied in fiscal year 
(FY) 1994. As stated in its first paragraph, the primary objective of the amendment was to limit 
the growth of government. To do so, it imposes limitations on the amount of revenue that 
government can collect and spend; it also requires voter approval of any tax changes that would 
increase revenues. TABOR applies to all levels of state and local government in Colorado. 
 
Provisions 
TABOR has a number of provisions. It is more comprehensive than most TELs. 
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Voter Approval of Tax Increases and Debt 
TABOR requires prior voter approval of any new tax, any tax rate increase, any increase in the 
assessment ratio for a class of property, any extension of an expiring tax, or any tax policy 
change that would cause a net tax revenue increase. Voter approval is also required for the 
creation of most financial obligations that extend beyond the current year unless government sets 
aside enough money to fund the obligation in all years that payments are due. The requirement 
for voter approval can be temporarily suspended for tax increases in declared emergencies. 
 
Spending (Revenue) Limits 
TABOR limits the maximum annual percent change in government spending in a given fiscal 
year to the sum of the inflation rate (as measured by the Denver-Boulder-Greeley consumer price 
index) and a measure of growth in the prior year. For the state, the growth measure specified is 
the percent change in population (as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau) in the prior year. For 
local governments other than school districts, it is the percent change in the valuation of real 
property in the jurisdiction; for school districts, the growth measure specified is the percent 
change in student enrollment. 
 
Since TABOR classifies as spending any transfer of revenues into reserve accounts or to other 
governments, the limit effectively applies not only to spending but to revenues. Thus, in practice, 
TABOR operates as a limit on revenues that can be retained by government. The TABOR limit 
applies to spending of both general fund and cash fund revenues (both taxes and fees), but 
excludes federal funds, litigation settlements, gifts, and donations. 
 
TABOR Surplus 
Any revenue collected above the allowable TABOR limit for that fiscal year must be refunded to 
the taxpayers in the following fiscal year. The amendment does not specify the refund 
procedures to be used. With voter approval, a government may retain or spend all or a portion of 
its TABOR surplus. 
 
Other Provisions 
 
Prohibited Taxes. Any new or increased real estate transfer tax, local income tax, or state real 
estate property tax is prohibited by TABOR. Any state income tax change is required to have a 
single tax rate applicable to individuals and corporations with no surcharge and may not take 
effect until the following tax year. 
 
Emergency Reserve. TABOR requires an emergency reserve equal to 3 percent of fiscal year 
spending. This reserve can only be spent in a declared emergency. The amendment defines 
“emergency” to NOT include economic or fiscal crises. 
 
Voter Approval for Changes in Existing Revenue, Spending, or Debt Limits. Any changes 
that would weaken current limits on state or local government revenue, spending, or debt require 
voter approval. 
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Government Enterprises. Enterprises, defined as a government-owned businesses approved to 
issue revenue bonds that receive less than 10 percent of revenue from state and local taxes, are 
exempt from TABOR limitations. 
 
Comparison of TABOR to Other TELs 
Colorado’s TABOR is generally considered to be one of the most restrictive TELs in the country. 
This evaluation is founded on the following characteristics of TABOR compared with other 
TELs: 
• Growth in TABOR revenues is limited to the sum of the percent change in population 
and the inflation rate. This formula apparently is based upon the assumption that 
government spending should grow only if it has to provide services to a larger population 
or if the cost of providing services increases. It ignores any effects of increases in 
standard of living or other factors. In most years, this type of limit is more restrictive than 
a limit based on change in aggregate personal income. 
• The TABOR limit is based upon the lesser of the prior year’s limit or actual revenues in 
the prior year. Whenever Colorado’s revenues are less than the allowable limit, a so-
called “ratchet-down effect” occurs, with the lower actual revenue figure becoming the 
new base for calculating the next year’s limit, and the TABOR limit is permanently 
reduced for subsequent years. This ratcheting down typically occurs during recessionary 
years when government revenues temporarily fall significantly. Colorado’s method of 
selecting the limit is more restrictive than the procedures used by other states. For 
example, if the calculation is based only on the previous year’s allowable limit or as a 
maximum percentage of personal income, no similar ratchet-down effect would occur. 
(Effectively, the ratchet-down effect in TABOR was eliminated in 2005 by the passage of 
Referendum C by Colorado voters. A discussion of Referendum C is included in a later 
subsection of this report.) 
• TABOR establishes limits on general fund and cash fund revenues (hereafter referred to 
as TABOR revenues). Revenue limits generally are more restrictive than expenditure 
limits. In addition, TABOR applies to a broad definition of revenues, not just the general 
fund, and also applies to fees in addition to tax revenues. 
• The Arveschoug-Bird limit, a second TEL in Colorado, also establishes limits on general 
fund appropriations. Their growth is limited to a maximum of 6 percent. In many years 
during the 1990s, this limit was more restrictive than the TABOR limit. 
• TABOR requires the refunding of any surplus in the next fiscal year. Any other use of the 
surplus must be approved by the voters. In most other states, these funds can be put into a 
rainy-day fund or used for other purposes. 
• Any change in the tax system that would result in a net increase in revenues must be 
approved by the voters. The TABOR limit applies to aggregate revenues, but this 
provision prohibits changes that would increase revenues from one tax to offset decreased 
revenues from another. 
• The TABOR definition of an “emergency” specifically excludes economic conditions or 
fiscal crises. 
 
Fiscal Impacts 
Colorado’s early experience with TABOR was benign due to the rapid economic and 
demographic growth the state experienced during most of the 1990s. By 1992, when TABOR 
7 
 
was adopted, Colorado had emerged from stagnant economic conditions of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and joined other states in beginning a period of strong growth that lasted through 
2000. Rapid population growth continued during the 1990s and in combination with moderate 
inflation produced annual TABOR growth factors averaging about 6 percent from FYs 1994 
through 2001. 
 
Even with robust economic growth, Colorado did not incur its first TABOR surplus until FY 
1997, the fourth year of its existence. Revenues exceeded the TABOR limit for five consecutive 
years, resulting in a total of more than $3.2 billion in TABOR surpluses that were refunded to 
taxpayers. (The only year since then with a refund was FY 2005, bringing the cumulative total 
refunds to $3.3 billion.) Permanent cuts in both income tax and sales tax rates were enacted in 
1999 and 2000, which reduced the stream of TABOR revenues (and the TABOR surplus) about 
$1 billion per year (Johnson et. al. 2004). 
 
TABOR did not specify the refund procedures to be used in years of a TABOR surplus or require 
that those procedures be voter approved. Lawmakers put in place many different mechanisms to 
refund TABOR surpluses. In FYs 1997 and 1998, all of the surplus was returned to taxpayers in 
the form of a sales tax refund that averaged $56 in FY 1997 and $219 in FY 1998. In FY 1999, 
the sales tax refund averaged $231, but nearly 15 percent of the total refund went to a much 
smaller number of taxpayers in two special classes: those claiming an earned income tax credit 
(EITC, with an average refund of $130) and businesses that paid personal property tax (average 
refund of $1,539). 
 
The number of tax breaks grew to 17 by 2001, when 36 percent of the total refund was allocated 
to special classes including capital gains, charitable contributions, rural health care providers, 
pollution-control equipment, and farmers. The sales tax refund that went to 2.8 million taxpayers 
averaged $206 in 2001. The EITC credit that 211,000 taxpayers qualified for averaged $156. 
These refunds were small compared to the roughly $5,000 average refund received by those 
qualifying for the capital gains credit and the very small number qualifying for the rural health 
provider credit. Under current law, many of these tax breaks aimed at special-interest groups 
have been scrapped, leaving only three refund mechanisms: the sales tax, earned income tax 
credit, and a temporary income tax rate reduction (Watkins 2010). 
 
Colorado’s economic boom ended in 2001 as the combination of the dot-com crash, the national 
recession, and the impact of the September 11th attack hit the state hard. Personal income growth 
fell from second-fastest in the nation in 2000 to 49th in 2002. State revenues subject to the 
TABOR limit fell by 12.6 percent in FY 2002 and declined an additional 1.1 percent in FY 2003 
(Colorado Office of Strategic Planning and Budget 2004). 
 
The Legislature responded to the fiscal crisis with three policies to offset the revenue shortfalls: 
transferring monies from cash and reserve funds to the general fund; increasing existing fees and 
establishing new ones; and cutting spending. In the absence of a rainy-day fund, the Legislature 
used $1.1 billion in one-time transfers from cash and reserve funds to prop up the general fund. 
To deal with revenue shortfalls to cover immediate needs and arguably to mitigate the ratchet-
down effect, government officials in Colorado also increasingly relied on fee increases. 
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Proponents point to Colorado’s TABOR as the most effective TEL, citing the billions of dollars 
in TABOR-generated refunds to the state’s taxpayers (see for example Schlomach 2010). But 
TABOR also created serious negative impacts on the fiscal situation and the quality of life in 
Colorado by forcing substantial cutbacks in the level of government services. While all 
government activities came under increased budget pressure, some programs, such as Medicaid 
and corrections, whose budgets are driven by forces outside the control of normal budgeting 
considerations—federal mandates, sentencing laws, etc.—were not seriously affected. This 
meant that other programs bore a disproportionate share of the cuts. 
 
A further confounding factor has been the inherent conflict between the state’s TABOR and 
Amendment 23, which was passed by the electorate in 2000. TABOR led to reductions in 
elementary and secondary (K-12) education funding that forced school districts to increase class 
sizes and to cut many programs and services. In response, Amendment 23 requires spending on 
K-12 education to increase on a per pupil basis by the rate of inflation plus 1 percent for 10 years 
and by the inflation rate thereafter. Even with the mitigating effects of Amendment 23, 
Colorado’s state and local government noncapital funding for K-12 education as a proportion of 
personal income fell from 32nd in the nation in 1992 to 46th in 2008. 
 
With mandated programs and K-12 education at least partially shielded from budget cuts, higher 
education, public health programs, and capital projects were the hardest hit of the major areas of 
government. For example, higher education funding per resident student dropped by 31 percent 
(after adjusting for inflation) between 1995 and 2005. As a result, in terms of higher education 
funding as a proportion of personal income, Colorado declined from 35th in 1992 to 48th among 
the 50 states by the mid-2000s. Similarly, state funding for the Department of Public Health and 
Environment dropped by one-third as a proportion of personal income from 1992 to 2004 (Lav 
and Williams 2010). 
 
Referendum C 
The base for determining the following year’s TABOR limit was reduced when actual revenues 
fell below the allowable TABOR limit in FYs 2002 and 2003, as a result of the recession that 
began in FY 2001 and the slow recovery from the recession. Actual revenue in FY 2002 was 
$366 million lower than the limit. Similarly, revenue in FY 2003 was $584 million lower than 
the limit. Because of the ratchet-down effect, the TABOR base for FY 2004 was $950 million 
below the FY 2002 base. Thus, even when revenues rebounded, the base to which the state 
applied the formula was permanently shifted down by nearly $1 billion. 
 
The Colorado economy began to improve by 2004, but the ratchet-down effect in TABOR 
prevented the use of the rising tax revenues to restore the budget cuts that had been implemented 
due to the sharp declines in revenues during prior years. In response to this damaging situation, a 
legislative referendum was developed and approved by the voters in 2005. This Referendum C 
allowed the state to retain and spend all revenues collected above the TABOR limit during FYs 
2006 through 2010. After this five-year “timeout period,” the referendum eliminated the ratchet-
down effect by establishing a Referendum C “cap” defined as equal to the highest total state 
revenue for a fiscal year during the timeout period adjusted for inflation and population growth. 
In subsequent years, a given year’s Referendum C cap is based on the previous year’s cap rather 
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than the prior year’s spending. Any revenue collected above the cap will be refunded to 
taxpayers via the mechanism defined by TABOR. 
 
Any revenues retained on account of Referendum C—revenue above the TABOR limit but 
below the Referendum C cap—by state statute must be spent only on health care, education, 
firefighter/police retirement plans, and “strategic” transportation projects. The law allowed the 
first $55 million in FY 2006, $95 million in FY 2007, and $125 million each year thereafter to be 
spent on any of these areas. Any additional retained revenue must be distributed equally to K-12 
education, higher education, and health care (Watkins 2009). During the first three fiscal years 
after the passage of Referendum C, retained revenues averaged about $1.2 billion per year. 
However, no revenues were retained during FY 2009 or FY 2010 as a result of declining 
revenues due to the recession that began during FY 2008. The Colorado Legislative Council 
forecasts that the state will realize substantial retained Referendum C revenues for its forecast 
period of FYs 2011 through 2013, but will remain below the cap so that no TABOR refunds are 
forecast through FY 2013 (Colorado Legislative Council 2010b). 
 
The spending allowed by Referendum C slowed the decline in funding for public services but 
has not been sufficient to undo the combined impacts of TABOR and two recessions since 2000. 
As of 2009, Colorado still ranked 45th among the states in total expenditures as a proportion of 
personal income, 48th for K-12 education, 49th for Medicaid, 48th for higher education, and 
48th for highways (Colorado Fiscal Policy Institute 2009). It is important to recognize the state 
would have faced significant budget shortfalls had Referendum C not been approved. Therefore, 
the Referendum C money that has been spent was not really “new” money in many instances—
rather it maintained programs and prevented them from undergoing cuts. It is impossible to 
estimate these effects because it would require knowledge of what budgetary actions the state 
would have taken had Referendum C not been approved (Colorado Legislative Council 2010a). 
 
TABOR and Economic Growth 
Colorado experienced rapid growth in economic activity in the 1990s. While proponents of 
TABOR claimed that the strong growth resulted from the shrinking government sector, the 
nonpartisan Colorado Legislative Council (2003) found no evidence that TABOR played any 
role in the expansion or subsequent contraction of business activity in the state. After a detailed 
analysis of the historical development of Colorado’s economy, the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities concluded that the state’s prosperity in the 1990s was fueled by long-term factors that 
were in place before the passage of TABOR. These included public and private investment, a 
highly educated workforce, and an advantageous Rocky Mountain location (Lyons and Johnson 
2006). Similarly, based on a detailed econometric analysis, McGuire and Rueben (2006) 
concluded that TABOR did not boost Colorado’s economy. Colorado enjoyed economic success 
brought by the boom in the telecom industry and related expansions in information technology 
industries. Arguably, this rapid economic expansion masked any adverse effects from TABOR 
until the inevitable economic downturn occurred in 2001. 
 
Colorado’s economic growth, measured in terms of real per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP), exceeded the national average in the six years prior to the implementation of TABOR. 
Among 10 western states, Colorado ranked fourth. This relationship continued through the first 
eight years of TABOR—through the end of the economic cycle in 2001. However, in the last 
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economic cycle (from the end of the 2001 recession through the end of the latest recession in 
2009) Colorado’s economic performance slumped. Its growth rate was below the U.S. average 
and the state ranked near the bottom of the western states. 
 
TABOR, of course, is not the only factor that might be contributing to the lowered economic 
performance in Colorado. However, the apparent delayed effect of TABOR on economic 
performance is easily explained: (1) the fiscal problems caused by TABOR cumulate over time, 
and (2) it can take years for reductions in funding for education and physical infrastructure—key 
economic development factors—to have an impact on economic growth given the long time that 
companies take to decide on expansions or relocations. 
 
A TABOR-LIKE LIMITATION IN ARIZONA 
Arizona seems an unlikely candidate for a TABOR-like limitation. By “TABOR-like” the 
reference is to the two primary provisions of Colorado’s TABOR: (1) growth in revenues is 
limited to the sum of the percent change in population and the inflation rate; and (2) the limit is 
based on actual revenues in the prior year, resulting in a ratchet-down effect. 
 
Arizona state government already has a TEL (Arizona Constitution, Article 9, Section 17) that 
limits total state appropriations to 7 percent of personal income. (The limit has increased over 
time to 7.41 percent to reflect the shift of certain public functions to state government from other 
governments.) Moreover, the overall tax burden in Arizona is already lower than in most states 
and lower than it was in the past. A series of state government tax cuts that began in the early 
1990s resulted in a decline in Arizona’s overall state and local government tax burden from 9.7 
percent of per capita income in 1991 to 8.5 percent in 2008, ranking Arizona 41st among the 50 
states (Rex 2009). Focusing on state government taxes since proposals for a TABOR-like rule in 
Arizona apply only to state government revenues, Arizona’s relative tax burden is even lower. 
 
State government own-source revenue (all revenue in all funds except that received from the 
federal government) is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau annually for each state. The figures 
for Arizona and Colorado are shown in Chart 1 expressed as a percentage of the national 
average. In FY 1993—the year preceding the implementation of TABOR—per capita revenues 
(the top graph) were nearly identical in Arizona and Colorado at 11 percent below the national 
average. Even with TABOR in place in Colorado, per capita revenues in Arizona fell to 
significantly below those in Colorado, except during the mid-2000s when the real estate boom in 
Arizona temporarily boosted state government revenues. In FY 2009, per capita revenues in 
Arizona were 12 percent less than in Colorado and ranked 47th among all states. Arizona’s 
revenues fell so much because of a long series of significant tax reductions implemented during 
this period. 
 
Instead of the per capita figure, the second graph of Chart 1 displays own-source revenue per 
$1,000 of personal income, again expressed as a percentage of the national average. Per capita 
personal income in Arizona is substantially lower than in Colorado, causing Arizona’s revenues 
relative to those in Colorado to appear higher rather than lower as in the per capita measure. 
(Historically, Arizona’s per capita income was about 10 percent less than that in Colorado, but 
since the early 1990s the differential has fallen to 21 percent.) However, the trend over time is 
consistent with the per capita graph: as a percentage of the national average, Arizona’s figure 
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CHART 1 
STATE GOVERNMENT OWN-SOURCE REVENUES 
 
PER CAPITA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE NATIONAL AVERAGE 
 
 
 
PER $1,000 OF PERSONAL INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE NATIONAL AVERAGE 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau (revenues and population) and Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (personal income). 
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dropped more than 15 percentage points between FYs 1993 and 2009, while the decline was only 
8 percentage points in Colorado. 
 
These conclusions are consistent with the findings of Edwards, Moore, and Kerpen (2003) who, 
in writing for the Cato Institute, noted that Arizona was one of the few states in the nation that 
did not reap a “windfall” in revenue collections in the 1990s. 
 
The revenue for Arizona used in Chart 1 includes a voter-approved initiative in 2000 that 
increased the sales tax in order to increase education funding. If the revenue collections 
associated with this voter-led tax increase were subtracted from total own-source revenues, 
Arizona’s figures would be even lower. 
 
Proposals 
Almost every year since 2000, a concurrent resolution has been introduced in the Arizona 
Legislature for a constitutional change that would establish a TABOR-like rule in Arizona. 
Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) 1026, introduced in January 2011, is the latest version. In 
addition, Senate Bill (SB) 1408 and a similar bill (SB 1231) each could effectively create a 
TABOR-like rule in Arizona. House Bill (HB) 2707 would restrict revenues in a manner 
consistent with TABOR. A second resolution (SCR 1019) would restrict state government 
spending to a greater extent than is the case currently. 
 
SB 1408 
This bill would add a new section to statute that requires that the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee, beginning in the year 2012, to compute and transmit “Truth in Spending” estimates 
for the following fiscal year in February of each year. Two estimates would be produced, one for 
the general fund and one for all state government appropriations from all sources. The estimates 
are to be calculated as the amount of current fiscal year appropriations adjusted for population 
growth and inflation. 
 
While the bill does not prohibit appropriations beyond this limit, in any year that appropriations 
above the limit are recommended by the Legislature, a joint meeting of the House and Senate 
appropriations committees must be held in which a roll call vote will be taken. Further, the bill 
requires that the recommendation to exceed the truth-in-spending estimate be prominently 
publicized. 
 
This bill was passed the Senate and sent to the House by March 3, 2011. If passed by the 
Legislature and not vetoed by the Governor, this bill would become law and would be in effect 
for the determination of the FY 2013 budget. If future legislatures are reluctant to exceed the 
truth-in-spending estimates due to fear of voter backlash or other reasons, then the bill 
effectively becomes a TABOR-like law, complete with a ratchet-down effect. 
 
SB 1231 
This bill also would add a new section to statute. Like SB 1408, this bill requires that the Joint 
Legislative Budget Committee publish early in each regular legislative session beginning with 
2012 an appropriation limit equal to the amount of current fiscal year appropriations adjusted for 
population growth and inflation. SB 1231, however, is limited to the general fund. Exempted are 
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appropriations made for the repayment of outstanding debt incurred before June 30, 2011; and 
appropriations made to restore deferred payments from FY 2011 into the current fiscal year. 
 
While SB 1231, like SB 1408, does not prohibit appropriations beyond this limit, in any year that 
appropriations above the limit are recommended, it requires that the Legislature also enact a 
separate concurrent resolution that acknowledges that the budget exceeds the limit and expresses 
the intent to authorize the expenditure of state general fund revenues in excess of that amount. 
 
SB 1231 is narrower than SB 1408, applying only to the general fund and exempting certain 
appropriations from the limit. Otherwise, SBs 1231 and 1408 are two means to the same end, 
effectively differing only in the steps required of the Legislature to notify the public of a decision 
to exceed the limitation. Unless future legislatures choose to exceed the published limit, SB 1231 
effectively becomes a TABOR-like law applicable to the general fund, complete with a ratchet-
down effect. This bill was passed the Senate and sent to the House by March 3, 2011. 
 
HB 2707 
Labeled as the “Fiscal Accountability Act,” this bill would restrict general fund revenues. The 
limit would be the lesser of the prior year’s actual revenues or revenue limit, adjusted for 
inflation and population growth. Thus, the passage of this bill also would result in a ratchet-down 
effect. Unlike the other measures, inflation would be based on the consumer price index for the 
Phoenix metro area. 
 
The bill also specifies that general fund appropriations cannot exceed the revenue limit. In the 
case of revenues in excess of the limit, the bill specifies the uses of those surpluses to be, in 
priority order, (1) repayment of general fund debt, (2) use in emergencies (a budget deficit would 
not constitute an emergency), (3) payments to the budget stabilization fund, and (4) refunds to 
those filing individual income tax returns. 
 
SCR 1019 
This resolution would amend the current TEL in the Arizona Constitution by lowering the 
existing appropriation limit of 7.41 percent to 7 percent in FY 2013 and to 6.4 percent in 
succeeding years. The amendment also would allow any resident to sue to enforce its provisions. 
To become effective, the resolution must be passed by the Legislature and receive an affirmative 
public vote at the next general election. 
 
This is the least restrictive of the five bills and resolutions; it does not involve TABOR-like 
restrictions. However, the passage of this resolution would result in state spending being 
permanently below the historical norm. From FYs 1980 through 1995, appropriations exceeded 
6.4 percent in all but one year. Since then, only in FYs 2006 and 2007 has the figure been above 
6.4 percent. As of March 3, 2011, this resolution was awaiting a vote of the full Senate. 
 
SCR 1026 
The TEL mechanism proposed in SCR 1026 replaces the state’s current TEL and is similar in 
concept to Colorado’s TABOR but differs in some respects. The main features of the proposed 
budget rule, as amended, include: 
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• It repeals the existing appropriation limit and the ability to exceed the limit with a two-
thirds legislative vote. 
• Beginning in FY 2014, appropriated state revenues would be limited to a maximum of 
the previous year’s appropriations adjusted by sum of the percentage changes in inflation 
and state population growth. 
• Funds in excess of the limit may be appropriated for the budget stabilization fund (BSF). 
An upper limit for the BSF is established at 10 percent of the appropriations limit. 
• Funds in excess of the limit may also be appropriated for a state emergency fund (SEF). 
An upper limit for the SEF is established at 5 percent. 
• Funds in excess of the limit may be appropriated to “proportionally refund excess state 
revenues to taxpayers in the state.” 
• The limit may be suspended for one fiscal year in either of two ways:  
o With a two-third vote of the Legislature and approval of the governor, an exception 
can be placed on the ballot of either a regular or special statewide election, but the 
public vote must occur prior to the passage of the budget. The following year's limit 
reverts to the appropriation limit determined by formula rather than that passed by 
public vote. If an affirmative public vote to exceed the limit occurs three years in a 
row, then the limit is reset based on the most recent publicly approved appropriation. 
o If an “emergency” is declared, a three-quarters vote of the Legislature and approval of 
the governor creates an exception, but appropriations above the limit can only be used 
for extraordinary expenses that could not be foreseen. Budget shortfalls are explicitly 
excluded as a reason for an emergency. 
• The resolution allows any resident taxpayer to sue to enforce its provisions. 
As of March 3, 2011, this resolution had received a “do pass with amendments” from the full 
Senate and was awaiting the final vote. 
 
Like Colorado’s TABOR, SCR 1026 ties annual increases in revenues that can be appropriated 
to the sum of inflation and population growth. And like Colorado’s TABOR mechanism prior to 
the approval of referendum C, the base for calculation of the current year’s revenue limit is 
defined as actual appropriated revenues in the previous year rather than the previous year’s 
limit—Arizona’s proposed rule would incorporate the so-called “ratchet-down effect” that was 
identified as a weakness of Colorado’s TABOR and corrected as part of Referendum C. 
 
The proposed Arizona TABOR rule allows allocation of collections above the limit to be 
deposited in the BSF, which is designed to smooth out cyclical fluctuations in the state’s general 
fund revenues by building up the BSF in good economic times when revenue surpluses exist and 
then drawing out monies to minimize budget cuts during recessions when revenues decline. The 
concept of putting revenues in excess of the limit in the BSF rather than mandating that all 
surplus revenues must be rebated to taxpayers in the next year as in Colorado’s TABOR is a 
fiscally sound idea. 
 
However, in each of the two recessions that have occurred since the creation of Arizona’s BSF, 
the available funding was not adequate to offset the declines in revenue during the recession and 
to prevent significant spending reductions. It is beyond the scope of this discussion of tax and 
expenditure limits to go into a detailed discussion of the weaknesses of the current BSF statue 
(see Charney 2009), but significant changes are needed to Arizona’s BSF before a link between 
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SCR 1026 and the state’s “rainy-day” fund would be an effective tool to reduce the impact of 
economic cycles on the state budget. 
 
Problems Created by a TABOR-Like Approach 
Advocates argue that a TABOR rule is needed to keep the government sector and tax burdens 
from growing over time. They contend that it simply forces government to “live within its 
means” like the rest of us. While it may seem a reasonable approach to limit revenue growth by a 
formula that purportedly would allow government to maintain the current level of services and 
provides adjustments for inflation and increases in the population to be served, imposition of a 
TABOR-like rule actually forces the government sector as a share of the economy to shrink over 
time, as discussed earlier for Colorado. 
 
There are several reasons why a limit based on an inflation-plus-population-growth formula 
leads to reductions in revenues and thus to public services: 
• Overall population growth does not reflect changes in many subpopulations served 
by government programs. The subpopulations served by government programs grow at 
different rates than the growth rate of total state population used in the formula. For 
example, over the 1993-to-2010 period (beginning with the base year for Colorado’s 
TABOR), the state prison population in Arizona grew 138 percent and the number of 
AHCCCS (Arizona’s Medicaid program) beneficiaries increased 192 percent while the 
state’s population grew by 81 percent. 
• The general rate of inflation does not reflect price changes affecting many public 
programs. While technological change and productivity gains have made many goods 
cheaper to produce, these economic factors do not have the same cost-cutting effects on 
services, including the services provided by government. Many of these services rely on 
trained professionals, such as teachers and physicians, and the substitution of capital 
equipment for labor that raised productivity in many industries is less successful. In fact, 
technological change is one of the major factors that are increasing the cost of medical 
care. Thus, changes in the cost of providing public services are not adequately measured 
by the overall inflation rate, so that funding increases governed by a TABOR-like rule are 
not sufficient to maintain existing service levels. While the overall rate of inflation over 
the 1993-2010 period totaled 41 percent (based on the GDP implicit price deflator 
specified in SCR 1026), medical care prices rose 93 percent (based on the medical care 
component of the consumer price index) and the cost of inputs for higher educational 
institutions increased 78 percent (based on the Higher Education Price Index produced by 
the Commonfund Institute). 
• A TABOR-like rule does not allow for funding new programs or changes in existing 
ones that may result from changes in state law, federal mandates, or legal decisions. 
AHCCCS and the School Facilities Board (the state agency that funds school 
construction) are two examples of state programs that have added hundreds of millions of 
dollars to the state budget. Similarly, formula-based budgeting does not allow the state to 
adjust to federal mandates that require states to spend more, as with the federal No Child 
Left Behind or Medicaid programs. 
• Setting the state budget limit to a fixed amount with adjustments only for increases 
in total population and the overall rate of inflation does not allow for changes in 
technology and society over time. Had such a TABOR rule been adopted as part of the 
16 
 
Arizona Constitution at statehood in 1912, then the standards of that time for education 
(small shares of children finishing high school and very few attending college), 
transportation (dirt roads), technology (no computers), etc. would be all that Arizona 
could afford in the 21st century. Restricting public sector funds to levels that do not allow 
it to respond to technological/societal changes over time is particularly ironic since many 
of the technological improvements and other changes that have transformed the small, 
primitive territory of a century ago to the Arizona of today were provided by government 
programs and paid for with public funds. 
 
The difference between inflation plus population growth and total economic growth—as 
measured by the state’s gross domestic product or personal income—has been approximately 1.7 
percent per year over the last four decades. This 1.7 percent per year represents the productivity 
growth in Arizona’s economy. This productivity growth is the major factor contributing to 
increases in wage rates, household incomes, and living standards for Arizona’s residents. 
When productivity rises and results in gains in inflation-adjusted per capita income, government 
spending is able to increase by more than inflation and population growth without the 
government sector’s share of the overall economy growing and without tax increases or a 
growing tax burden. This is the fundamental concept behind the current Arizona TEL, which 
limits appropriations to a percentage of state personal income. 
 
Most states with TELs have similar provisions to the existing TEL in Arizona, though several 
states have TELs in which the growth of revenues or spending is tied to the growth in state 
personal income rather than to the level of personal income. A budget limit that is linked to the 
size or growth of the state’s economy provides for the construction of public infrastructure and 
allows government programs to adapt to changes in technology and to respond to increasing 
societal demand for public services. A TABOR-like rule that freezes real per capita government 
spending, on the other hand, would not even maintain current service levels over time. 
 
The negative effects of a budget rule based on population growth and inflation are amplified 
when the limit is tied to actual appropriations of the previous year. This feature, which is 
incorporated in SCR 1026, SBs 1231 and 1408, and HB 2707, causes the so-called ratchet-down 
effect when revenue declines during economic downturns push actual revenues below the limit 
and lead to permanent reductions in the size of the public sector. With each economic cycle, the 
public sector shrinks in size faster than it would without the ratchet effect. 
 
Due to the significant reductions in revenues and expenditures over the last three years, SCR 
1026, SBs 1231 and 1408, and HB 2707 all would be implemented based on historically low 
levels of state revenues/appropriations. They would lock in the very low spending that resulted 
from revenue drops during the worst recession in 70 years and from permanent tax cuts based on 
temporary revenue surpluses that resulted in a more than $2 billion structural deficit. 
 
Revenue Implications of a TABOR-Like Rule 
TABOR is championed by proponents as a measure that keeps the government from growing. 
However, the following arithmetic demonstrates that application of TABOR-like rules—even 
without a ratchet-down effect—actually leads to substantial reductions in the share of the 
aggregate economy that comprises the public sector. These illustrations are directly applicable to 
17 
 
the Arizona economy, but the basic arithmetic conclusions are generally applicable to all 
economies. 
 
For those with a taste for shrinking government, TABOR is a savory recipe. However, a 
shrinking government means reduced funding for education, infrastructure, and a host of other 
services used by most residents. With labor force quality and infrastructure the most important 
economic development factors, reduced public funding for education and infrastructure will 
cause the state’s economic competitiveness to steadily fall over time. 
 
While Colorado’s TABOR applies to state and local governments, the proposals in Arizona 
(SCR 1026, SB 1231, SB 1408, and HB 2707) would impact only state government revenues. 
Therefore the following analyses focus only on state government revenues and appropriations. 
Though the general fund is the focus of most state budget discussions in Arizona, SCR 1026 and 
SB 1408 apply to all state government appropriations—the sum of the general fund and a large 
number of specialized funds. Thus, the following analyses focus on total revenues and 
appropriations. 
 
Simulations of what would have occurred to revenues and appropriations in Arizona had a 
TABOR-like provision been in effect in the past are presented using two measures. Arizona’s 
existing TEL is based on a specific definition of appropriations that adds and subtracts certain 
items from the total appropriation figure reported in the appropriation reports. Since SCR 1026 
uses the same definition, the time series of appropriations subject to the TEL and calculated by 
the Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee is used as one measure. Since data using this 
definition are not available for other states, or for Arizona prior to FY 1980, additional 
simulations use “own-source revenue” that is compiled for all 50 states by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. Own-source revenue excludes federal funds but otherwise is a comprehensive measure 
of state government revenues. 
 
Using Actual Appropriations 
Arizona’s existing TEL went into effect for FY 1981. This is the starting point used for the 
simulation using the JLBC appropriations data. Two series were simulated. One is based on the 
language in SCR 1026, which would result in a ratchet-down effect. To calculate the ratchet 
effect, in any year in which the actual percent change in appropriations was less than the percent 
change allowed by the formula, the actual percent change was used to set the limit for the 
following year. The other series assumes that the formula is tied to the prior year’s formula-
generated limit rather than to actual appropriations, thereby eliminating the ratchet-down effect. 
 
As seen in Chart 2, the effects of tying appropriation growth to inflation plus population growth 
start small but grow substantially over time—even in the case of no ratchet effect. The FY 2011 
budget under the inflation plus population growth provision would have been 22 percent less 
than the actual budget, which already reflects very substantial spending reductions made over the 
last three years. The budget would have been 59 percent less with the ratchet-down effect. Total 
appropriations (not just those in the general fund) in fiscal year 2011 would have been $2.8 
billion less than the actual $12.8 billion without a ratchet effect and $7.5 billion less with a 
ratchet effect. 
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CHART 2 
APPROPRIATIONS IN ARIZONA UNDER A TABOR-LIKE RULE COMPARED 
TO ACTUAL APPROPRIATIONS, BEGINNING IN FISCAL YEAR 1981 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee (actual appropriations) and U.S. 
Department of Commerce: Census Bureau (population) and Bureau of Economic Analysis (inflation). 
 
 
Actual appropriations in FY 1980 were 6.96 percent of personal income. In FY 2011, the actual 
share was down to 5.74 percent. The share under an inflation plus population growth provision 
would have been only 4.5 percent without a ratchet effect and just 2.4 percent including 
ratcheting. 
 
These substantial effects that occurred over three decades would continue to grow in magnitude 
over a longer time span. The long-run negative effect of an inflation plus population growth rule 
was stated succinctly by Rep. Brad Young, chairman of Colorado’s Legislative Budget 
Committee: “There is a hole in the bottom of the boat—that is the TABOR spending limit. It 
works for a little while, but you go out in the future and you sink the boat.” (Colorado Springs 
Gazette 2004). 
 
With a ratchet effect in place, the differential between actual appropriations and those allowed by 
an inflation and population growth formula continually grows. Without a ratchet effect, the 
differential, while generally becoming larger over time, fluctuates from year to year. The 
differential rapidly becomes larger during economic expansions, as during FYs 2004 through 
2007, when surges in revenue allow appropriations to increase relatively rapidly. In contrast, 
during recessions, as in FYs 2002 and 2003 and again from FYs 2008 through 2010, the 
differential narrows due to a plunge in revenue collections. 
 
Using Own-Source Revenues 
The following simulation results are based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s own-source revenue 
series to allow comparisons with other states. The end point of the simulations is FY 2009—the 
most recent year for which these data are currently available. The first set of simulations uses the 
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same FY 1981 starting point as in the simulations discussed in the previous section. As with the 
simulation of actual appropriations, two series—one with a ratchet-down effect and one 
without—were simulated. 
 
As seen in Chart 3, even in the case of no ratchet effect, the FY 2009 budget under the inflation 
plus population growth provision would have been 18 percent less than the actual budget, which 
already reflects very substantial spending reductions made over the last three years. The effect is 
almost three times as large considering the ratchet effect. Appropriations in FY 2009 would have 
been $2.9 billion less than the actual $15.9 billion without a ratchet effect and $8.4 billion less—
less than one half of actual own-source revenues—with a ratchet effect. 
 
Arizona’s own-source revenues in FY 1980 were 8.3 percent of personal income. In FY 2009, 
the actual share was down to 7.2 percent. The share under the proposed limit would have been 
only 5.9 percent without a ratchet effect and just 3.4 percent with ratcheting. 
 
In FY 1980, Arizona’s total own-source state revenues were equal to the national average. By 
FY 2009, the state’s actual own-source revenue collections were 26 percent below the national 
average and ranked 47th on a per capita basis and 40th as a share of personal income. But if 
Arizona had adopted beginning in FY 1981 an inflation plus population growth budget limitation 
similar to the mechanism proposed in SCR 1026 (which would result in ratchet-down effects), 
the limit on appropriations from own-source revenues would have been 65 percent below the 
national average and ranked 50th on both a per capita basis and as a share of personal income. 
Arizona’s figure would have been more than 40 percent below the next lowest state. Even if the 
proposed budget rule was modified to eliminate a ratchet-down effect, the limit on appropriations 
 
 
CHART 3 
OWN-SOURCE REVENUES IN ARIZONA UNDER A TABOR-LIKE RULE 
COMPARED TO ACTUAL REVENUES, BEGINNING IN FISCAL YEAR 1981 
 
 
Source: Calculated from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau (own-source revenues and 
population) and Bureau of Economic Analysis (inflation). 
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from own-source revenues would have been 39 percent below the national average and ranked 
50th on both a per capita basis and as a share of personal income. 
 
The negative consequences that a TABOR-like rule would have on the public sector become 
very clear when examined over a longer time horizon. Simple illustrations using historical 
Arizona data demonstrate how over time an inflation plus population growth rule would result in 
drastically shrinking the relative size of the public sector. 
 
The effects of a TABOR-like rule show up over longer time periods simply because of the 
arithmetic compounding of minor differences in growth rates. This can be demonstrated 
dramatically by assuming that an inflation plus population growth rule had been in effect in 
Arizona for 50 years and looking at what the effects would have been between FYs 1959 and 
2009 (see Chart 4). 
 
In FY 1959, per capita own-source state government revenue was $123 per Arizona resident (the 
equivalent of $739 in 2009 dollars). With a budget limit mechanism similar to that proposed by 
SCR 1026, which includes ratchet-down effects, by FY 2009 the limit on own-source revenue 
would have been only slightly more than one-sixth of actual FY 2009 revenues. In fact, on a real 
per capita basis the FY 2009 limit would actually be 42 percent lower than the FY 1959 figure. 
In terms of share of state personal income, the limit for FY 2009 would have been 84 percent 
below the national average and 79 percent below the figure for Florida, the state currently ranked 
50th. 
 
 
CHART 4 
OWN-SOURCE REVENUES IN ARIZONA UNDER A TABOR-LIKE RULE 
COMPARED TO ACTUAL REVENUES, BEGINNING IN FISCAL YEAR 1960 
 
 
Source: Calculated from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau (own-source revenues and 
population) and Bureau of Economic Analysis (inflation). 
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Implementation in FY 1960 of an inflation plus population growth rule including the ratchet-
down effect would have resulted in the state government’s share of the Arizona economy 
shrinking from 6.5 percent of personal income in 1959 to 1.3 percent in 2009, less than one-sixth 
of the national average of 8.1 percent. The limit for total appropriated revenues in FY 2009 
would have been only $2.8 billion. For comparison, actual state government expenditures for 
elementary and secondary education alone in FY 2009 was $4.2 billion and Arizona already 
ranks near the bottom of the fifty states on per pupil K-12 expenditures. 
 
Even without ratchet-down effects considered, by FY 2009 the limit on own-source revenue 
would have been less than one-third of the actual figure. In terms of share of state personal 
income, the limit for FY 2009 would be 69 percent below the national average and 62 percent 
below the figure for the state currently ranked lowest. Implementation of an inflation plus 
population growth rule in FY 1960 without ratchet-down effects still would have resulted in the  
state government’s share of the Arizona economy shrinking from 6.5 percent of personal income 
in 1959 to 2.2 percent in 2009, barely more than one-quarter of the national average. 
 
FISCAL ALTERNATIVES FOR ARIZONA 
Arizona’s fiscal system has various shortcomings. However, a TABOR-like rule does little to 
resolve these issues and creates serious additional problems. 
 
The revenue system is a significant concern due to its narrow and outdated base. The result is 
that revenue collections are highly cyclical and do not keep pace with economic growth. The 
Arizona Town Hall made a number of important recommendations regarding the revenue system 
in November 2009: http://www.aztownhall.org/95. The background report prepared for the 
Arizona Town Hall, Riding the Fiscal Roller Coaster: Government Revenue in Arizona, is 
available from the same website. 
 
Subsequent to the Town Hall, a plan to create jobs, improve the state’s economic 
competitiveness, and balance the budget was prepared: Roadmap to Arizona's Economic 
Recovery: A Package to Create Jobs, Improve the State's Economic Competitiveness, and 
Balance the Budget, available at  http://economist.asu.edu/public-finance. A report prepared for 
the Arizona School Boards Association (accessible from the same website) went beyond the 
revenue system to examine the entire fiscal system. Other than the revenue system, of most 
significance is the need to strengthen the state’s budget stabilization fund and to force a link 
between changes in revenues and changes in expenditures. 
 
Most recently, a proposal included in The Executive Budget issued by the office of Governor 
Brewer in January 2011 (http://www.ospb.state.az.us/documents/2011/FY2012-
ExecutiveBudget-Summary.pdf) addresses fiscal issues other than those of the revenue system. 
 
Governor’s Proposal 
In the latest annual Executive Budget, budget reform is addressed in a manner very different 
from a TABOR-like provision. The Governor’s proposal has four key planks: an annual limit on 
the percentage increase in spending, guidance on how to handle revenues greater than the 
expenditure limit, bolstering the budget stabilization fund, and strengthening executive branch 
powers regarding appropriations. 
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The Governor’s Office acknowledges that the budget crisis in part results from the use of one-
time revenue surpluses during years of strong economic expansion to make permanent tax 
reductions and permanent spending increases. To prevent a temporary revenue surplus in the 
future from resulting in a permanent spending increase, the Governor’s proposal includes 
generally capping the level of expenditures to those in the prior year increased by the average 
revenue growth rate of the last 10 years. 
 
To avoid the negative effects of the recent long and deep recession from unduly affecting the 10-
year average revenue growth, the proposal limits the loss of revenue in any year to 2 percent 
(actual decreases in ongoing general fund revenues were 9 percent in FY 2008, 21 percent in FY 
2009, and 10 percent in FY 2010). The Governor’s proposal allows the spending cap to be 
adjusted for voter-approved revenue increases, changes in federal law, and court-mandated 
expenditures. In addition, the cap would be systematically rebased “to remain relevant.” 
 
The Governor’s proposal also lays out a priority system for the use of excess revenues (revenue 
growth in a year in excess of the 10-year average) that occur in years of strong economic 
expansion: 
 1. Debt reduction 
 2. Rollover reduction 
 3. Budget stabilization fund deposits 
 4. One-time capital projects 
 5. Tax rebates 
 
Also included in the Governor’s proposal are three constitutional reforms. The first would place 
the operation of the BSF under constitutional controls that ensure that deposits to and 
withdrawals from the BSF are made according to formula and that inappropriate uses of the BSF 
are not allowed. In addition, the current cap of 7 percent would be increased to 15 percent, as in 
the original law passed in 1990. 
 
The second proposed constitutional change would allow the Governor to quickly reduce 
appropriations when it becomes apparent that revenues for the current fiscal year will fall short 
of authorized appropriations. Third, in addition to the line-item veto of the legislatively passed 
budget that is already allowed, the Governor would be able to line-item reduce an 
appropriation—that is, rather than entirely accepting or rejecting an appropriation, a figure in 
between the two extremes could be selected. 
 
Evaluation of Governor’s Proposal 
The Governor’s proposal to strengthen the BSF and to prioritize the use of budget surpluses are 
fiscally sound ideas that would help resolve some of Arizona’s fiscal problems. However, the 
proposal falls short of solving the identified problem of the use of one-time revenue surpluses to 
make permanent tax reductions and permanent spending increases. Its provisions for a spending 
limitation introduce significant problems, though not as severe as those resulting from a 
TABOR-like provision. 
 
Though permanent tax cuts are not on the proposed list of uses of excess revenues, nothing in the 
proposal prevents the Legislature from making further permanent tax reductions. In fact, the 
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Governor has just called a special legislative session to reduce business tax burdens that will cost 
the state more than $500 million in revenues once fully implemented. Over the last two decades, 
permanent tax reductions have created much greater problems than have permanent spending 
increases; tax cuts since the early 1990s have cumulated to nearly $3 billion after adjusting for 
inflation and the state’s population growth. 
 
The proposed spending limit is intended to be a statutory change. To be effective, it needs to be 
included in the Arizona Constitution for the same reasons that the Governor proposes making the 
operation of the BSF constitutional. 
 
The mechanism specified to determine the spending limit—a 10-year average revenue growth 
rate—has deficiencies. Though the proposed flexibility in the limit lessens these concerns 
somewhat, significant issues remain: 
• The proposed flexibility in the spending limit does not include the case of a revenue 
increase or decrease passed by the Legislature. Various tax reductions that lowered 
revenues were passed by the Legislature during the last 10 years, reducing the 10-year 
average growth rate. 
• The proposal makes no mention of allowing expenditures to recover from the deep cuts 
implemented over the last three years in order to balance the budget. Thus, these 
spending reductions would be made permanent. 
• Revenue growth depends in part on both inflation and population growth. If the 
experience over the last 10 years is not representative of the current period, then the 10-
year average is a poor choice for determining future expenditures. 
• Revenues over time have not increased at the pace of economic growth due to the 
existing revenue system’s shortcomings (including its narrow base and outdated tax 
code). Again, historical revenue collections are a poor basis for determining future 
spending limitations. 
• Revenue growth fluctuates widely over an economic cycle. Rather than a 10-year 
average, it would be better to use the average of growth from the same point in the prior 
economic cycle (or, for a longer period, the same point of the cycle before that) through 
the latest year of the current economic cycle. 
 
Although there are serious issues with the Governor’s proposed spending limit that should be 
addressed, it would be far less damaging to public services and to the Arizona economy than the 
three TABOR-like measures introduced in the Legislature. Those measures create a rigid rule 
that would result in a huge decrease in the quality and quantity of public services over time. In 
contrast, the Governor’s proposal allows some flexibility and revenues would not fall 
dramatically over time. 
 
Recommendations 
As an alternative to the provisions of the Governor’s proposal regarding a spending limit, the 
existing constitutional spending limit is adequate to protect against increases in the size of state 
government. However, since spending has been so far below the limit for many years, the 
existing limit does not preclude permanent increases to spending from being made without an 
equivalent increase in revenues. 
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The most effective solution is for the Constitution to prohibit any permanent increase in spending 
from being made without an accompanying permanent increase in revenues of an equal 
magnitude (or equivalent decreases in other spending categories). Likewise, no permanent 
reduction to tax rates or bases would be allowed without corresponding reductions in spending of 
an equal magnitude (or equivalent increases in other revenues). 
 
One exception would need to be made to these prohibitions. Spending would be allowed to rise 
without a permanent revenue increase (or offsetting spending reductions in other categories) 
following a recession during which spending reductions were made in order to meet the 
constitutional requirement to balance the budget. With an adequate BSF and with changes to the 
revenue system proposed in the reports cited above, instances of needing to use this exception 
would be very infrequent. 
 
If an annual spending growth limit is deemed essential, it should be tied to the average change in 
inflation-adjusted per capita personal income over the latest economic cycle (or two cycles), 
adjusted for expected inflation and population growth over the next year. This would be more in 
line with the existing constitutional appropriation limit that is tied to personal income. Under this 
limit, government spending could increase no faster than the pace of the overall economy; state 
government would remain a constant share of the economy; and the tax burden would not rise. 
 
Because current spending is far below historical levels due to the sharp recessionary-caused 
declines in revenues in recent years and to the structural deficit, current spending is an 
unrepresentative point for starting a new expenditure limit. Instead, the spending limit should be 
tied to FY 2008 adjusted for subsequent inflation, population growth, and real per capita personal 
income growth. 
 
A fundamental problem with any attempt to “rein in spending” by imposing a TABOR-like rule 
or using a revenue growth rule such as proposed by the Governor is that such efforts fail to 
recognize that it is the Legislature’s responsibility to provide funding for certain public-sector 
functions that are explicitly discussed in the Arizona Constitution. In addition, the Legislature 
must follow federal law, which includes demands that state and local governments provide 
various public services. 
 
According to the Arizona Constitution, among other services, state government must provide 
“correctional and penal institutions, and institutions for the benefit of persons who have mental 
or physical disabilities” (Article XXII, Section 15). In particular, Section 10 of Article XI 
specifies that “… the legislature shall make such appropriations, to be met by taxation, as shall 
insure the proper maintenance of all state educational institutions, and shall make such special 
appropriations as shall provide for their development and improvement.” 
 
The proponents of TABOR-like provisions implicitly assume that there is some underlying 
tendency for lawmakers to increase spending. Arizona’s existing appropriations limit already 
protects from state government becoming an ever-growing share of the economy. In reality, state 
government spending has decreased since the limit was put into the state’s Constitution (see 
Chart 5). Instead, the state’s fiscal problems largely result from the repeated reduction in tax 
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bases and rates over the last two decades that have resulted in significant decreases in revenues 
(see Chart 6). 
 
The solution to the budget imbalances is not to impose formula-driven expenditure rules. Instead, 
the Legislature needs to ask Arizonans what public services (in addition to those specified in the 
Constitution or in federal law) are desired. Then, the public must be asked to fully pay for public 
services. Asking people to pay for the public services they receive will be an effective deterrent 
to excessive spending. Indeed, the problem today is that there is often a complete disconnect 
between demands and willingness to pay for the costs of public service delivery. 
 
 
CHART 5 
APPROPRIATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS LIMIT AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
PERSONAL INCOME, ARIZONA STATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Source: Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee. 
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CHART 6 
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES PER $1,000 OF PERSONAL INCOME, 
ARIZONA STATE GOVERNMENT GENERAL FUND 
 
 
Source: Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee (revenues and expenditures) and the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (personal income). 
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